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Abstract: 
This article investigates the effects of the Soviet social engineering project and forced 
secularization in Central Asia. Emphasis is placed on the ideological foundations of 
Marxism-Leninism, its stance on atheism, its holistic character, and its ideological 
exclusivity. The article details the measures taken by authorities to eradicate religious 
beliefs during the seventy years of Soviet rule. Taking the case of Tajikistan, it 
highlights the remaining influence of Soviet policies on state-religion relations by 
reviewing the functions and responsibilities of current regulatory institutions as well 
as laws and official discourses framing religious practices. 
 
 
Introduction 
Following the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, the modernization process in the 
Soviet Union was imposed with the help of extensive financial and material 
resources as well as propaganda. Though their message was emancipating, the 
Soviets used highly repressive methods to impose their authority, including 
arrests as well as the physical elimination of saboteurs and opponents. Seventy 
years of Soviet rule have profoundly impacted former Soviet societies and the 
extent of the socio-economic transformation is especially striking in Central 
Asia, when compared to its southern neighbour, Afghanistan. 
Almost certainly, such repressive political order will have left people 
bitter and unregretful. Yet, Russian-American scholar Alexei Yurchak 
denounces the common popular and academic assumption that the Soviet 
period only represents a dreadful historical period. He is careful to avoid 
using antagonistic positions between resistance and collaboration and instead 
proposes to analyse social behaviour as entailing “interesting and creative acts 
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of rendering communist ideology meaningful within the broader frame-work 
of human values” (Yurchak 2003, 482). Following this line of thought, this 
article investigates the effects of the forced secularization and the Soviet social 
engineering project in Central Asia. It suggests interpreting the reality of 
socialism in terms of accommodation of values rather than passive resignation 
(Froese 2008) or resistance (Poliakov 1992). It focuses on socialization and 
education to argue that even though secularization was not entirely successful, 
in the sense that Soviets failed to eradicate religion completely, the attempt to 
secularize its population deeply informed the understanding of the place of 
religion in society for generations of Soviet citizens. I will first present an 
overview of the Soviet ideology by emphasizing its holistic character and how 
it informed the implementation of secular policies. I will then address the 
debate on the success or failure of the secularization process in Central Asia. In 
the third part, I will make use of the Tajik case to highlight the remaining 
influence of Soviet policies on state-religion relations in Tajikistan. I will 
outline the similarities between Soviet and post-Soviet institutions and 
discourses by illustrating the authorities’ attempt to subordinate religious 
practices and define an Islam consistent with national ideals.  
Secularizing Central Asia 
The Soviet ideology, with its absolute values and objectives, aimed at the 
creation of a new society and a new man. Soviet thinkers fully acknowledged 
the holistic character of the ideology promoted by the Communist Party. This 
was not perceived as something negative, quite the contrary. A noteworthy 
statement of this position is Lenin’s famous quote: “The Marxian doctrine is 
omnipotent because it is true. It is complete and harmonious, and provides 
men with an integral world conception which is irreconcilable with any form 
of superstition, reaction, or defense of bourgeois oppression” (Lenin 1913).  
Because Marxism-Leninism was a philosophy “that has implications for 
just about every aspect of society, from the family to international relations” 
(Marsh 2011,18), some authors conceptualise it as a religion in itself with its 
own ideology, worldview, moral codes, and rituals (Agadjanian 2011; 
Codevilla 1971; Marsh 2011). Codevilla suggests that: “for its messianic and 
prophetic attitude, it [Marxist-Leninism] takes on a religious hue” (Codevilla 
1971, 26). Yet, as Keller puts it, “If we consider for a moment the role of 
Marxism-Leninism as a quasi-religion, Stalin and his supporters, in fact, 
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exhibited very little faith in their doctrine” (Keller 2001, 250). Despite the civic 
rituals, the cult, and the myths Communists have built over time, I do not 
regard Materialistic-Atheism as a religion. Gellner (1991) is right when he 
underlines the impossibility of associating Soviet Marxism with religion. Even 
though he acknowledges the similarities between Marxism and religions, 
Gellner argues that: “at the doctrinal and intellectual level the proud boast of 
Marxism was that it had exiled the supernatural from social life” (1991, 1). 
Following Pospielovsky, I argue that Sovietism is a worldview which entails: 
“1- A certain vision of the relationship between man and nature 2- A concrete 
understanding of the relationship between man and society or groups of men 
and society 3- A certain understanding of the meaning of life, of human nature 
and its destination” (Pospielovsky 1987, 21). 
Husband argues that atheism was not a significant part of the 
Bolshevik’s prerevolutionary messages nor did it influence their victory. 
Instead, the revolutionaries elaborated ad hoc the complex cultural strategies 
that would transform the face of the empire (Husband 2000, 35). Much 
confusion marked the first years of Soviet rule in the newly created Turkestan 
Republic. Politics is often a process of trial and error, and so were the early 
Soviet policies by which leaders, in an uncertain administrative, political and 
social environment, introduced rapid changes while trying to avoid creating 
too much unrest. Various decrees and laws were adopted to further codify the 
practice of religion, especially the status of religious organizations rather than 
individuals, who were being addressed through other means, namely, atheist 
propaganda and social pressure. Constitutional amendments, laws and 
decrees were frequently subject to change and reflected their respective socio-
political times. Before the 1930s, the pressure on religious communities was 
constant but diffuse compared to the more radical actions against religious 
figures and believers that would be taken by the Soviet authorities later during 
the period known as the “Great Stalinist Purges,” between 1930 and 1939. 
Overall repression was brutal and some reports estimate that between 1917 
and 1939, 140,000 Muslim clergy were arrested, killed, or exiled (Keller 2001, 
241). 
Although repression was never completely abandoned, in the later 
years, emphasis was put on propaganda and education. Kenez rightfully 
points out that the word propaganda carries a negative connotation. Indeed, 
people usually understand propaganda as a Machiavellian attempt to 
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disseminate false information in order to influence or fool people. However, 
he suggests that, unlike the Nazis, the Soviets were not interested in the 
techniques or philosophy of mass persuasion; instead, they saw propaganda 
as part of education campaigns (Kenez 1985, 8). Beyond propaganda efforts, 
education and literacy campaigns truly became the capital agent of change. 
Agitatsiya1 can only give limited results and reach a limited number of 
individuals, whereas public education can sway a very large and 
impressionable young audience. Indeed, authorities thought that a high level 
of social and economic development combined with a materialistic atheistic 
education would inevitably lead to the transformation of the society, from 
god-fearing to godless (Skazkin 1968, 479). As Gellner argues (2008), modern 
education systems serve to inculcate shared understandings and values so that 
people understand, interact, and cooperate with each other in modern, 
production-oriented societies. In August 1930, the adoption of a decree on 
General Compulsory Primary Education at the all-Union level was echoed in 
similar laws in each Republic, even though implementation proved difficult in 
the conservative environment of Central Asia (Keller 2001, 209). Soviet 
atheism specialists insisted on the educational aspect of atheist propaganda 
that would lead to the achievement of socialist goals. Kurochkin, a Soviet 
ideologue, explains how the scientific and materialist atheistic Weltanschauung 
must be reproduced and expanded in every new generation of socialist society 
(Kurochkin 1983, 144), because according to him the danger of religious 
revival was never far away. The following instruction of one Soviet ideologue 
evokes the need for, and the expected results of, atheist propaganda: 
It is necessary to conduct systematic extensive scientific atheist propaganda, 
to patiently explain the fallacy of religious beliefs that have arisen in the 
past due to the people’s domination/pressure under elemental forces of 
nature and social oppression and their ignorance of the true causes behind 
natural and social phenomena. It should build on the achievements of 
modern science, which fully reveals the picture of the world, increases the 
power of man over nature, and leaves no room for the fantastic religion’s 
fiction on super-natural forces (Rosenbaum 1985, 29). 
The liberation of women from the patriarchal oppression imposed by 
feudal and capitalist societies was also an important aspect of the socialist 
project, and the promotion of women’s rights was an integral part of the 
political platform of the Bolsheviks from the very beginning. In Marxist 
                                                
1 In Russian, agitatsiya refers to public campaigning or action meant at creating awareness on a specific 
topic. 
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rhetoric, Central Asian women were identified as a “surrogate proletariat”2 
because of their subordinate position within the patriarchal structure of both 
the society and the family. Therefore, women had to be liberated (Northrop 
2004, 12). In Central Asia and in the Muslim regions of Russia, the promotion 
of women’s rights had twin objectives: to ensure the equality of rights for men 
and women, but perhaps even more importantly, to undermine the Islamic 
clergy and religious traditions (Northrop 2004). 
Due to their own weak organisational capacities, as well as popular 
discontent and the clergy’s social and political importance, at the beginning of 
the Forties, the Bolsheviks returned to what Keller refers to as “the strategy of 
Catherine the Great,” that is, “control through co-optation.” Authorities felt 
they had no choice but to try to channel religious behaviour by establishing 
religious standards, trying to make them as compatible as possible with Soviet 
norms. The creation of religious administrations in the post-war period 
provided authorities the means to achieve this goal by reaching believers and 
by trying to influence their religious practices.3 Four such administrations 
appeared throughout the Soviet Union during the war period: the Spiritual 
Administration for European Russia and Siberia in Ufa, for the Northern 
Caucasus in Buinaksk (Dagestan),4 for Transcaucasia in Baku and also the 
Spiritual Muslim Board of Central Asia (SADUM)5 (Ro’i 2000, 100). Multiple 
factors doubtless explain the decision to create religious administrations,6 but 
the bottom line is that the regime perceived the clergy and religious 
communities “as a defeated and controllable enemy” (Keller 2001, 251). The 
end result was the creation of an official Islam in the USSR that was used to 
frame religious practices as well as an instrument of foreign policy when 
dealing with Muslim countries (Fourniau 1994, 118).  
This instrumentalisation of religion created space for the official practice 
of religion as well as religious teaching, which was kept under the close 
                                                
2 Massell (1974) was the first to use this term.  
3 Other faiths had their own religious administrations but, unlike for Muslims, their representation 
was not territorial. Russian Orthodox, Gregorian Armenian, Evangelist Christian Baptists and 
Lutherans had representations while Roman Catholics and Jews had no centre (Ro’i 2000, 23). 
4 This directorate was moved to Baku in 1974 (Ro’i 2000, 100). 
5 The acronym stands for its name in Russian: Srednoe Aziatskoe Dukhovnoe Upravlenie Musul’man. The 
latter would become primus inter pares (Ro’i 200, 53).  
6 The most common explanation for the creation of these bodies is that they were a reward for Soviet 
Muslims who participated in the war effort (Haghayegi 1995, 26-27) as well as an attempt to give a 
democratic image to the authorities (Babajanov 2000b, 81). 
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supervision of the authorities (Sadur 1989, 439; Babajanov 2000, 82-3). From 
1948 to 1991, there were only two functioning medresses7 in the whole of 
Central Asia, the Mir-i Arab one, opened in Bukhara in 1946 and the Al-
Bukhari in Tashkent founded in 1956. In 1971, the Institute for Higher Islamic 
Studies was established in Tashkent (Epkenhans 2010, 317). There were no 
official medresse apart from the ones in Uzbekistan, so the opportunities to 
learn the basics of religion legally were nearly nonexistent, since private 
religious education was forbidden. Yet, many religious figures engaged in the 
unregistered teaching of students. The existence of these secret religious study 
cells, or hujra, was an open secret, winked at by the KGB (Brill Olcott 2007, 30). 
As much as they would have liked to get rid of competing religious 
ideologies forever, Soviet authorities had no choice but to acknowledge them 
as an inevitable and undesirable defect, which must be dealt with. In fact, 
Soviet literature is filled with conclusions and recommendations about the 
resilience of religion and suggestions for future adoption of methods to 
undermine it (Pospielovsky 1987). Soviet institutions of regulation kept 
manifestations of religion under strict control but there were rituals performed 
outside sanctioned mosques and sometimes with the complicity of local 
authorities on state farms for instance.  
This is a phenomenon referred to as “parallel Islam.” The term is 
borrowed from Soviet sociologists and was first introduced by Alexander 
Bennigsen in 1968 (Poujol 2005, 53). It refers to the type of Islam practised 
during the Soviet period as opposed to the Islam labelled as “official,” which 
was promoted and controlled by the SADUM. Parallel Islam was clandestine 
but supported by a network of underground organizations, mainly Sufi 
Brotherhoods (Myer 2001, 181). Ro’i, who helped popularize the term, 
underlines the importance of parallel Islam by pointing out that the number of 
official mosques in the Soviet Union comprised only 1% of the actual total 
(Ro’i 2000, 288). By way of comparison, in the 1980s, there were officially 200 
“central” mosques in Central Asia (Abdulgani 1989, 405),8 three of them in 
Northern Tajikistan (two in Leninabad and one in Proletarsk). Poliakov’s 
                                                
7 An advanced religious school. 
8 The Tajik designation is Masjidi Jomeh (Friday mosque) and Sobornaya mechet’ (Cathedral mosque) in 
Russian. 
Thibault  —  The  Soviet  Secularization  Project  in  Central  Asia      17  
ethnographic expedition,9 however, estimated the number at around 200, a 
number at least equal to that of pre-Soviet times (Poliakov 1992, 96-97). In 
1982, in Tajikistan, no less than 21 underground schools were discovered by 
the authorities (Ro’i 2000, 358). Numerous testimonies of Central Asians tell of 
secret performances of religious rites, including Islamic weddings (Nikoh), 
circumcisions (Hatna) and funerals (Dzhanoza), as well as stories of people 
praying in caves or among trees, or secretly riding bikes at night to attend 
religious classes. Such activities placed people at great personal risk, as they 
could be prosecuted for performing such acts or for attending unsanctioned 
services.10 Indeed, contrary to Gellner’s opinion in 1991 that in the USSR, “faith 
has now totally disappeared” (1991, 1), religion did not vanish. Despite the 
coercion of religious leaders, severe repression of believers and 70 years of 
persistent atheist propaganda, religious beliefs and rituals lived on, albeit 
altered.  
The Soviet Modernization Project: Views on Success and Failure 
Many authors have underlined the failure of the Soviet’s transformative 
attempt. For instance, Myer’s survey of the literature shows that a majority of 
scholars endorse the idea of a failed transformation. In particular, they 
emphasize Central Asian peoples’ distinctiveness, manifested through the 
persistence of local languages (as an important cultural marker), the survival 
of cultural traditions (respect for elders, gender division, large families), and 
the resilience of religion (Fierman 1991). Poliakov suggested that, in many 
respects, the structure of the traditional society has been preserved because 
Soviet authorities simply superimposed their authority on existing structures, 
notably, production units in Central Asia (Poliakov 1992, 17). The issue of 
religion is what authors see as the breaking point dividing Muslims from 
Russians and the main reason why assimilation did not work (Myer 2001, 169-
173). Rywkin (1982) has most strongly stated the failure of Soviet policies in 
Central Asia and “USSR’s Muslim problem.”11  
                                                
9 Sergei Petrovich Poliakov is a Russian ethnographer who published an influential book in the USSR 
in 1989 about everyday Islam in Central Asia; his research focuses mainly on Northern Tajikistan. His 
main findings point to the failure of Soviet policies and the continuing influence of the clergy and 
traditional ideas among the population. Poliakov’s work was later strongly criticized for its 
prescriptive ethnography, which represented a typical Soviet view on religious life (Deweese 2002, 
315).  
10 In Turkmenistan, circumcision was forbidden until 1989 (Poliakov 1992, 56).  
11 In the 1970s and 1980s, authors like Rywkin (1982) and Carrère d’Encausse (1978) predicted that the 
USSR’s Muslim republics would be the ones precipitating the fall of the Union because of their 
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DeWeese refers to this discussion as a “fruitless debate” and argues that, 
when comparing Central Asia to the rest of the Islamic world, it is easy to 
conclude that the Soviets definitely “succeeded all too well” (DeWeese 2002, 
302). Therefore, the question should not be whether or not the Soviets 
managed to transform the societies of the former USSR but how? On that 
matter, Adams, in her investigation of the cultural revival in post-Soviet 
Uzbekistan, mentions: “The story that I find myself telling is one not of an 
Uzbek cultural renaissance blossoming in the wake of independence but, 
rather, of the successful institutionalization of a Soviet cultural schema that 
continue to define Uzbek culture and national identity” (Adams 1999, 336). 
Dealing more specifically with the issue of religion, Wanner suggested that 
secularization does not lead to the eradication of religion but rather that 
secularization processes draw on “particular views of how religion should 
relate to politics, governance, and public affairs and lead to religious change” 
(Wanner 2011, 219). The focus here should not be on the extent to which 
atheistic ideas conquered the hearts and minds of individuals but rather on the 
way it affected people’s understanding of the role of religion in society. 
Accommodation in Context 
Yurchak has adroitly touched upon the issue of accommodation with his study 
of the appropriation and reinterpretation of Soviet values and discourses by 
the late Soviet generation. He proposed to study Soviet hegemony not only in 
relation to its hegemonic discourse but its “meaning inscribed in ideological 
performance and representation” (Yurchak 2003, 480-1). He advised scholars 
to “question how Soviet people in fact interpreted the lived ideology and 
reality of socialism” (Yurchak 2003, 485). 
 The concept of accommodation supposes that imposed practices and 
discourses are not only contested or passively accepted but can be negotiated 
and contribute to the making and remaking of personal and socio-political 
identities. Thinking in terms of accommodation instead of resistance or 
resignation allows us to give agency to individuals in a broader sense than by 
referring to the concept of resistance. This is the case because resistance 
usually implies a concerted and motivated defiance of authorities. In James 
                                                                                                                                                   
demographic weight and the failure of transforming Muslim people into Homo Sovieticus, to use a term 
coined by Carrère d’Encausse. As history showed, it was rather nationalist mobilizations in the Baltic 
republics that destabilized the country. 
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Scott’s examination of peasant resistance in Malaysia, he described “everyday 
form of resistance,” actions that required little or no coordination and which 
were conducted with “ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups such 
as foot dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, sabotage, etc.” As a result of 
these mostly non-violent actions, peasants engaged in low-intensity conflicts 
with the authorities (Scott, 1985, 29). And yet, while Scott’s studies gave a new 
understanding to the concept of resistance, it did not allow for the 
consideration of different responses to authoritative change because people 
don’t always resist; many comply, many defy, but many more accommodate. 
As summarized by Husband: “In a larger context, far more citizens 
everywhere practice accommodation than ever take up activism” (Husband 
2000, 150).  
Husband looked at secularization campaigns in Russia between 1917 
and 1932 and studied the way people tried to resist and to accommodate the 
imposition of a secular lifestyle. In trying to break the image of passive 
submission conferred to populations, Husband mentions that it created 
“circumstances in which individuals and groups not only had the opportunity 
to reevaluate their relationship to the sacred, but indeed could not escape 
doing so” (Husband 2000, 162). Northrop goes in the same direction by 
focusing on strategies of Central Asians to cope with Soviet colonialist policies 
(Northrop 2004), in particular the transformation of gender relations in the 
absence of proletarian classes. Northrop focuses on the discursive and physical 
battle over the definition of proper forms of everyday life, which involved 
both the Soviet authorities and Uzbek women and men. In his later book, 
which covers the whole Stalinist period, he concludes that: “In the local 
encounter between Soviet power and Central Asia, both sides emerged 
transformed” (Northrop 2004, 345). Northrop acknowledges that by the late 
1960s in Uzbekistan, “the Russians’ self-styled European mission appeared, at 
long last, to have achieved hegemony among Central Asians themselves” 
(Northrop 2004, 351) and that in contemporary Uzbekistan, the Hujum, the 
Soviet campaign for unveiling Central Asian Muslim women, is almost 
universally seen as a positive mark of progress and a landmark of the Uzbek 
nation’s development (Northrop 2001, 115).  
Beyond literacy campaigns and the transmission of values via a 
standardized education, Suny argues that the Soviet authorities and the 
intelligentsia managed to foster emotional connections “first to the Revolution 
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and Civil War, the project of creating a new world, then to Lenin and Stalin as 
personifications of the Soviet project, later to the victory over fascism” (Suny 
2012, 23). The end result was the creation of a powerful civic culture that 
connected persons from an extended space. Likewise, Lane suggests that 
Soviet rituals were effective tools because they often blended with 
“interpersonal values that bind the individual to his family and his local 
community” and “rechannel them towards the large and more impersonal 
political collective” (1984, 215). 
Indisputably, Central Asia ended up being profoundly transformed by 
the Soviet social engineering project. But given the resilience of traditional 
customs and religious habits, there is no doubt that Sovietization was not 
entirely successful. The Soviet transformative process cannot simply be 
described as the imposition of foreign atheist modernistic norms and values 
upon traditional societies. Opposing both the idea of the resignation of Soviet 
peoples and the exceptionalism of the Soviet experience, Suny argues that: 
“supposed Russian exceptionalism is to see the ethnic or national as self-
generated and the socialist and Soviet to be an artificial imposition” (Suny 
2012, 17). The social engineering project should rather be seen as a process of 
forced negotiation between foreign and local norms in which some local actors 
retained agency. 
Accommodation and Path Dependency 
I will now address the Constitutional aspects, the laws and institutions that 
frame the practice of religion in today’s Tajikistan in light of the Soviet legacy. 
The objective is to underline how accommodation leads to the reinterpretation 
of Soviet practices. I do so by highlighting the similarities between Soviet and 
post-Soviet institutions and discourses and by illustrating the authorities’ 
attempt to subordinate religious practices and define an Islam consistent with 
national ideals.  
Overall, provisions of the Tajik Constitution are rather standard and do 
not reveal much about state-religion relations. Yet, it testifies of the Soviet 
heritage since it explicitly mentions the secular character of the state in their 
Constitution.12 More importantly, in Tajikistan, the presence of institutions 
                                                
12 Very few national Constitutions have this provision. Those include the five Central Asian countries, 
Azerbaijan, but also France and Turkey (Fox 2011).  
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such as the Council of Ulemas and the Committee of Religious Affairs,13 heir to 
the SADUM, the Soviet Tajik Qaziat and the Soviet Committee of Religious 
Affairs clearly illustrate the institutional continuity with the Soviet period.14 
The Council is more concerned with the spiritual aspects of religious life and 
training whereas the Commitee is a governmental body enforcing the laws 
regulating religious practice. Independent on paper, these institutions are not 
perceived as such and often criticized for following the official party line. 
Politics in Tajikistan has been characterized by a lack of political plurality 
since the end of the civil war in 1997. Though genuine opposition parties exist 
and compete in the elections, the President’s People’s Democratic Party of 
Tajikistan always wins a majority of seats in Parliament. Also, due to 
Constitutional amendments adopted in 1999 and 2003, Emomali Rahmon has 
managed to remain President since 1994, though he has been acting as the 
Head of the state since 1991.15  
We find in Tajikistan, as well as in the other Central Asian Republics 
and Russia, a law called Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations. 
Like its earlier Soviet version, the law regulates freedom of conscience and 
freedom of religion, relations between the state and religious communities, as 
well as their legal status. Over the years, the law became increasingly detailed 
and restrictive. Originally adopted in December 1994, it was profoundly 
redrafted by the Tajik Committee of Religious Affairs (CRA) in 2006 and 
adopted only in 2009. Before and after its adoption, the law was denounced by 
local and international advocacy organizations as one of the most restrictive 
law on religion in the region (Corley 2009; OSCE 2006, 2008; Ozod 2009).  
Numerous provisions on the regulation of religious practices appear 
rather intrusive. For instance, the law deals with the number of mosques that 
can be erected. The same article stipulates that the selection of imams must 
receive the approval of the responsible state organ, that is, the Committee of 
Religious Affairs. By law, the CRA has no right to interfere with the selection 
of imams and local communities are responsible for selecting their own imam 
                                                
13 In Tajik, Shuroi Ulamo, in Russian Soviet Ulemov. 
14 Similar institutions are found in all Central Asian republics as well as in Russia. 
15 A new Constitution was adopted in 1994 and amended in 1999 and 2003. The 1999 Constitutional 
Referendum extended the presidential term from five to seven years while the 2003 amendments 
extended the number of terms that a Tajik president may hold office, from one to two seven-year 
periods (Abdullaev 2005). Rahmon was due to leave office in 2006 but was re-elected in the 2006 and 
2013 presidential elections. 
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through negotiation and deliberation. They then send the decision protocol to 
the CRA’s local office which provides the license. However, it appears that the 
CRA has a say in the choice of imams (Epkenhans 2010, 326), which 
unambiguously violates the neutrality of the state as well as undermines the 
independence of religious communities. 
Among other controversial provisions, procedures for the registration of 
mosques and religious associations have been complicated so that founding 
members must now provide local authorities with 200 signatures in support of 
their association. It thus limits the possibilities for small communities, 
especially non-Muslim groups, to set up an organization. This is a restriction 
that is reminiscent of Soviet practices as authorities considered small groups 
more suspicious than established religions, because they could not be easily 
monitored (Bryanov 1986, 54-55). Proselytism per se is allowed since religious 
communities have the right to inform people about their faith and beliefs; 
however, according to Article 23(4), they may not do so in state buildings, 
schools and private homes, which greatly restrict the capacities of 
communities to reach out to the public. Finally, Article 9(3) states that public 
officials, public servants, leaders, and members of political parties cannot fund 
or be employed by religious groups, which creates membership issues for the 
Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), the only legal faith-based party in 
Central Asia. Integrated into the country’s power structures in 1997 as a result 
of the signing of a peace agreement,16 the party has since been marginalized to 
the point that it is now threatened by a full-fledge ban (Asia Plus 2015).17 
Another controversial law, entitled Law on Parental Responsibility in the 
Upbringing and Education of Children, adopted in 2011, represents a serious 
infringement of religious rights. In particular, Article 8, entitled Parental 
education duties sparked the strongest critique.18 It most contentious provision 
                                                
16 The agreement devised the allocation of 30 per cent of the ministerial positions to the opposition, a 
provision that was slowly implemented and which remained largely unaccomplished (Kabiri 2002, 
55). Yet, in 1999, 5,377 veterans of the United Tajik Opposition joined the Army ranks as well as 
frontier and regular police services (Khamadov and Olimov 2003, 52).  
17 In 2000, the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan lost the Ministry of Economy, occupied by Davlat 
Usmon between 1998 and 2000 (Dudoignon 2005, 126). Immediately after the 2006 presidential 
election, which had been boycotted by the IRPT, Rahmon implemented a drastic reorganization of the 
administration, following which the IRPT was even more marginalized (RFE/RL 2006). 
18 The Communist Party of Tajikistan seems to have been the only opposition party in favour of the 
new legislation. The Communist leadership commented Article 8 in such terms: “We have students 
who leave aside their studies to hurry to the mosque, the state must necessarily respond to this” 
(Yudalshev 2011). 
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forbids parents to let children participate in the affairs of religious associations 
at the exception of those who are officially enrolled in religious education 
institutions and at the exception of funerals. At the same time, access to 
religious education has become more difficult as the number of religious 
education institutions has not ceased to decrease over the years. In 2003, the 
Islamic Institute in Dushanbe as well as 21 medresses were responsible for 
providing religious teachings (ICG 2003, 17). In 2010, there were still ten 
medresses in the Sughd region but many were closed down in 2011 (Rafiyeva 
2011). Finally, in the summer of 2013, the authorities suspended five of the 
country’s six remaining medresses, which were all located in Sughd. The CRA 
invoked that they failed to provide proper documents for registration 
(RFE/RL 2013). As such, the Medresse Abu Hanifa in Dushanbe, a joint project 
between the Tajik and Swiss governments, is now the country’s only 
functioning medresse but its future operation is now jeopardized (Islam News 
2015).  
On many occasions, President Emomali Rahmon has denounced 
religious education and its perverse effect on radicalization (BBC Monitoring 
2007, Najibullah 2010). Abdudjabbor Rahmonov, the Minister of Education 
between 2005 and 2013, was especially virulent in his condemnation of parents 
who send their children to study with mullahs (Asia Plus 2010). Such 
discourses are pervasive in Tajikistan and carry a negative tone that is 
reminiscent of Soviet anti-religious propaganda. The authorities’ inclination to 
control religious education exceeds national borders and the movements of 
Tajik students abroad have severely been curtailed. Concern over foreign 
education became especially salient after a Presidential speech in August 2010 
in which Emomali Rahmon urged parents to “bring their children home.”19 
According to him: “Most of them will become extremists and terrorists, 
because those schools don’t only teach religion” (Najibullah 2010). In fact, the 
Law on Freedom of Conscience stipulates that Tajik citizens may pursue religious 
studies only after receiving religious education in the Republic of Tajikistan 
and with the written consent of authorized state bodies on matters of religion 
and education (Article 8[6]). For that reason, Tajik authorities forced the return 
of nearly 2,000 Tajiks who were studying in foreign medresses or Islamic 
Universities in 2010. That summer, the authorities went as far as prevented in 
                                                
19 Already in 2007, he had blamed “parents who bring their child to a half-educated mullah, and with a 
stick he tells them to learn the Koran by heart” (BBC Monitoring 2007). 
24      From  Today’s  Observation  Post:  Collaboration  and  Resistance  under  Communism  
extremis aspiring students from boarding a plane at the Dushanbe airport prior 
to its departure to Iran (Najibullah 2010). Families of students were allegedly 
pressured by security enforcement agencies to urge their offspring to come 
back (Mirsaidov, Rasul-Zade and Dikaev 2010), after which some of them also 
had to face prosecution (RFE/RL 2011). 
Limited access to religious education certainly contributes to the 
popularity of foreign Islamic institutions. Also, many religious figures as well 
as political figures complain that the level of theological knowledge is very 
poor and that this encourages students to pursue their studies abroad (ICG 
2003, 17; Todzhiddinov 2011). Even the Consultative Council of the Muftis of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States20 is of this opinion and suggested 
that the Council should take measures to raise the level of education of 
religious leaders (Isazade 2013). 
Other measures have been taken to prevent Islamic foreign influence. 
The government has banned several organizations in the last few years. 
Among them are well-known groups such as the Hizb ut-Tahrir, al-Qaeda, the 
Taliban, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The last three are known 
for their terrorist activities; others, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb 
ut-Tahrir, hold fundamentalist views but are non-violent political parties 
(Karagiannis 2006). In the last decade, thousands have been prosecuted and 
condemned for their involvement in one of these organizations. Sentences 
tend to be heavy in Tajikistan and convicts received prison terms ranging from 
five to 30 years (Rafiyeva 2012).  
The subordination of religion to political orientations is undeniable and 
interestingly, authorities do not deny the control exerted over the Council. It is 
in fact presented as a necessary measure to protect Islam against deviances. 
On that matter, the words of the President of Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon are 
unequivocal:  
The state in the framework of the acting legislation has authority to 
oversight activities of religious organizations in order to protect peace, 
stability, noble birth and cultural values of the people in the country. The 
direct obligation of the Islamic Center and the Council of Ulemas of 
Tajikistan is to consider their sermons and moral admonitions. Therefore, it 
is the obligation of the concerned state government bodies to consider the 
                                                
20 The CIS is a regional organization regrouping nine countries of the former Soviet Union. 
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cases when such sermons and moral admonitions contradict to the 
Constitution and other acting laws of Tajikistan (Rahmon 2007).  
Cooptation of the clergy is reminiscent of past practices and shows how 
the clergy can be mobilized to convey the ideology proposed by leading 
political circles. It is through the control over their training, assignment and 
their speeches that the government can communicate preferred religious 
beliefs and orientations. Brill Olcott’s (1994: 154) assessment that in Central 
Asia “the relationship between Islam and the state remains as tense as it was 
in Soviet days” still resonates today. There is, in continuation with Soviet 
practices, a great subordination of religious institutions to the authorities and 
state apparatus. Like in Soviet times, regulatory institutions are not only 
responsible for organizing relations between the community of believers and 
the State but also to promote a “traditional” and “legitimate” Islam as opposed 
to a radical, foreign Islam. Constitutional provisions assert the separation of 
state and religion in Tajikistan. Yet, state practices testify of a great 
involvement in religious affairs.  
Continuity is also rhetorical in the sense that leaders carefully underline 
the threatening character of religion. Yet, whereas the Soviets tried to limit as 
much as possible the development of an Islamic identity, Tajik authorities are 
using the institutions to both circumscribe and steer the Muslim identity 
towards an Islam defined as national while using figures of the past (Olcott 
and Ziyaeva 2008, 22). Paradoxically, continuity also implies the persistence of 
problems such as the clergy’s lack of legitimacy due to the great proximity 
with the state apparatus. The codification and criminalization of a number of 
private religious practices is also reminiscent of the Soviet period. And like in 
Soviet times, many unregistered places of worship and study continue to exist 
clandestinely.  
Conclusion 
Scholarly and public opinions tend to see the Soviet socio-political project as 
something spectacular and unique, in opposition to the historical development 
of secularization in the Western world. Such a view overemphasizes the 
totalitarian dimension of the Soviet regime neglecting the agency of socio-
political actors (Yurchak 2003, 482). If the Soviet social engineering project was 
indeed incomparable, it is better understood as an accelerated modernization 
process rather than as an exceptional endeavour at odds with the development 
of the Western liberal societies. Still, in the Soviet case, state involvement in 
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socialization and education was so overwhelming and coercive that it was 
successful in imposing certain behaviours and inhibiting others for several 
decades. But we cannot simply talk of the imposition and assimilation of social 
norms; it is rather the transformation and appropriation of these values that 
contribute to shape today’s religious dynamics. I have argued that, rather than 
resignation and resistance, the concept of accommodation better reflects Soviet 
peoples’ reaction to modernization and the resilience of Soviet values. 
The reappropriation and internalization of values makes it difficult to 
distinguish between Soviet and post-Soviet orders and a great deal of authors 
contend that there is in fact no clear boundary between Soviet and post-Soviet 
periods (DeWeese 2002; Louw 2007; Peyrouse 2003; Rasanayagam 2011). 
Luehrmann’s fascinating piece on religious education in rural Russia proposes 
to see the secular (Soviet) and post-secular periods not as eras opposed to each 
other but as “sites of engagement that alternate and overlap in the lives of both 
societies and individuals” (2011, 199). There is today a great continuity in the 
people understanding’s of the place of religion in society, at both the political 
and social level. And in continuation with Soviet practices, religion continues 
to be greatly subordinated to the authorities and state apparatus.  
Paradoxically, the religious revival taking place in Central Asia could 
also be interpreted in light of the Soviet legacy. In my own work (Thibault 
2013), I suggested that Islamic values offset the Soviet holistic ideology, which 
can be explained by the affinities of religious and Soviet moral codes. Religion 
can be limiting as it imposes strict codes of conduct concerning social and 
personal behaviour in daily life. Yet, it matches a desire for social order in a 
difficult economic environment plagued by widespread corruption and lack of 
political openness. Just like the revolution in 1917 did not bring immediate 
socio-political changes, the sudden collapse of a whole ideological and 
political structure in 1991 did not result in the abrupt discard of the socio-
political routine. The disintegration of the USSR surely created a destabilizing 
environment that allowed new forces to emerge but the Soviet legacies remain 
important in our understanding of prevailing socio-political patterns. 
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